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Last month, the Democratic Left party left Greece’s coalition government, leaving PASOK and New
Democracy with a razor-thin majority and the expectation of fresh elections for the country. Nikitas
Konstantinidis argues that Greece’s political system has become much more fragmented in the
wake of the crisis, with voters also now paying more attention to populist promises than parties’
ability to deliver change. Party competition in Greece has also been further constrained by the
intervention of the EU and the Troika into domestic political life, severely limiting policy alternatives.
Despite a somewhat promising start, the coalition government of New Democracy (ND), PASOK,
and the Democratic Left proved to be short-lived, giving way last month to a more compact
bipartisan cabinet consisting of only ND and PASOK ministers (at an agreed ratio of two-to-one). Toiling under the
shackles of a sclerotic austerity program, the first few true attempts at structural reform and downsizing of the wider
public sector have met with mixed reactions and caused the three-party coalition government to implode. This is
only the first episode in a new political era of short-lived coalition governments with shifting partisan compositions.
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Does this necessarily pose cause for concern? Well, considering the fact that the prior well-entrenched two-party
system was the main culprit for numerous misgivings in state affairs, this might seem as a welcome change.
Complacency, a sense of impunity, and well-orchestrated political adversarialism were the hallmarks of Greek
politics in the period leading up to the Big Crash. The ‘cartelization’ of the political market by two catch-all parties
(PASOK and ND), who alternated in power throughout the era of the Metapolitefsi (1974-2012), was further
bolstered by patronage politics and self-perpetuating clientelistic networks; once the public sector ‘bubble’ burst, this
heretofore impenetrable system started crumbling like a house of cards. Party defectors were either left to linger as
independents in the political wilderness or moved to smaller splinter parties on either side of the ideological
spectrum (e.g., ANEL, DIMAR, SYRIZA). In an environment of increased political mobility, everyone is now jockeying
for position and striving for political survival in anticipation of the next round of elections.
The Greek party system (among others in Europe) is currently undergoing a rapid process of fragmentation and
polarization. In political science, the degree of party fragmentation is usually measured by the ‘effective’ number of
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parties in terms of the allocation of parliamentary seats and various power indices that measure the decisiveness of
different parties in the formation of a majority coalition. According to the inverse sum of squared seat shares index,
Greece was a solid two-and-a-half party system throughout the 1990s and 2000s (just like the UK). The shocking
results of the May 2012 elections marked a rise in the ‘effective’ number of parliamentary parties to 4.83, which was
subsequently consolidated to 3.76 because of the special strategic and highly politicized character of the June 2012
elections (with membership in the Eurozone hanging on the balance and an enormous amount of pressure
exercised from Europe). Figure 1 below traces the evolution of the index over time (1990-2012).
Figure 1 – Effective number of parties in Greece (1990-2012) by votes and seats
Concurrently, parties are becoming more ideologically compact, but also less effective in terms of the disbursement
of political rents (‘pork’). The loss of heretofore loyal and steady ‘clienteles’ has shifted electoral competition from the
dimension of valence to the level of rhetoric and ideology. Voters are now paying more attention to publicly
proclaimed ideas and less so to parties’ ability to perform and deliver. Another emerging aspect in the strategic
calculus of voting is parties’ perceived ability to be part of and to form viable and ideologically cohesive coalitions. On
the other hand, the vote for anti-systemic extremist parties (e.g., Greek Communist party, Chrysi Avgi) and their
uncompromising and obsessive attachment to a monolithic set of beliefs represents a form of protest against the
coalition politics of a moderate center. Partisanship levels have plummeted; the political marketplace has become
more open bestowing essential advantages to newcomers, while new partisan labels have become politically
expedient as symbols of a break with a sinful past. Naturally, there is a significant learning curve involved in this
transition to coalition politics. Henceforth, coalition governments are bound to become more durable and cohesive,
as politicians are schooled in the give-and-take of coalition politics and appropriate mechanisms of compromise and
consensus are gradually being put into place.
At the same time, the ideological space has become more constrained, in the sense that the extremes have
converged and that credible and internally consistent programmatic proclamations now have fewer degrees of
freedom. The decrease in the effective number of dimensions of domestic partisan competition is a direct
consequence of the country’s international commitments and its position within a globalized and interconnected
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environment; membership, for example, of the EU and the EMU have given rise to an inescapable and concrete
policy framework. Nowadays, ‘high politics’ effectively amounts to a small set of dichotomous choices and decisions
with respect to the country’s position within a dense network of supranational governance. In that sense, the ad hoc
Troika (European Commission, ECB, IMF) acts as a ‘censor’ of domestic political life. In light of the a wider
consensus on Greece’s position within that network (or effectively on its overall level of openness), the most salient
policies that trickle down to the regional and local levels are now ‘imported’ from or ‘imposed’ by foreign loci of
power.
This self-imposed ‘straitjacket’ does of course generate a lot of frustration in the expression of the people’s
democratic instincts, as they often feel handicapped in the face of global policy challenges that fall beyond the remit
of the liberal democratic institutions of the nation state (see, for example, immigration, financial regulation, fiscal
adjustment, environmental degradation, etc.). Such feeling of popular frustration is often voiced through heightened
populist rhetoric that relies on (unfounded) assumptions about the intentions and interests of foreign governments,
actors, and institutions, or even through mass movements of civil disobedience. In other words, the increased
polarization, fragmentation, and popular delegitimization of the Greek political system are symptoms of the
incompatibility of national democratic institutions with the country’s international position.
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